ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The bid-ask spread, or the difference between the lowest offered price to sell and highest price to buy, is a measure of the price concession a trader must make for immediacy in a transaction (Demsetz, 1968) . This spread is generally seen as consisting of three cost components, order-processing, inventory-holding and information asymmetry costs. While the first two costs, often referred to as real frictions, are directs costs the provider of immediacy incurs, the last component is compensation for trading with a better informed counterpart (Stoll, 2000) . If unregulated, insider trading (trades by directors, executives and large shareholders)
can represent a large proportion of the last component and can increase the cost of trading markedly. In illiquid markets, where insiders may represent a substantial proportion of trades, the impact on spreads would be even more detrimental for the market as a whole. In such markets, effective regulation may reduce information asymmetry, spreads and increase overall market efficiency.
Because of the damaging effects of insider trading, 80% of countries with financial markets have regulations that limit this behavior (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002) . It has also been shown that such laws reduce the harm from insider trading in a number of areas such as reducing the cost of capital (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002) , increased liquidity, more accurate prices and wider share ownership (Beny, 2005) , and increased analyst following (Bushman, Piotroski and Smith, 2005) .
Further, Chung and Charoenwong (1998) find that firms with more prevalent insider trading have wider spreads. This supports the theoretical models of Copeland and Galai (1983) , Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and others, that establish a positive relationship between informed trading, information asymmetry and spreads. While the relationship between informed trading and spreads has been well established, the role of regulation and its impact on the components of the spread remains unexplored. The effect reduction such regulation may have on information asymmetry is of particular relevance to small and illiquid markets. In this paper we address this issue within such a setting.
Our first and main contribution is to explore the effect insider trading regulation has on the cost of trading. In particular, we are interested in how a change in regulation affects the information asymmetry component of the spread. Changes in regulations are not observed frequently. However, in 2002, New Zealand changed its legislation with respect to insider trading (Securities Market Amendment Act 2002) providing a prime opportunity to investigate this issue. We apply the Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) , hereafter MRR, decomposition model to a sample of 70 of the most liquid New Zealand Stock Exchange listed companies before and after the introduction of significantly stricter insider trading regulations. We find a significant drop in the proportion of information asymmetry following the introduction of the new legislation. Conjointly, we observe a decrease in the spread and a significant decline in the contribution of information asymmetry to price volatility. As our second contribution, we separate the sample based on liquidity (number of trades) and pre-change information asymmetry. We find a large significant decrease in the most illiquid firms and those with the largest asymmetry, indicating that the regulation was most effective for these firms. Finally, because estimated components are sensitive to model specification (see De Jong et al., 1996) we employ Glosten and Harris (1988) as a robustness check. Our results confirm the notions of La Porta et al. (2000) , who state that government intervention is vital in reducing the prevalence and problems associated with insider trading.
The purpose of the Securities Market Amendment Act 2002 (SMAA), enacted in December 2002 was to correct major weaknesses in the previously enacted legislation. Before the enactment, enforcement was left to individual traders and the issuing company, and only large block holders were obliged to disclose in a timely fashion. As a consequence, these laws were never successfully enforced and insider profitability was large. Among other changes, the new laws required continuous disclosure by all insiders and allowed the Securities Commission to prosecute insiders.
i These were significant changes over the previous system and were enacted to reduce the prevalence of insider trading. The public enforcement by the Securities Commission should increase the chance of detection and prosecution making insider trading more costly. In addition, the continuous disclosure regime aims to reduce insider's trading and their profits.
The changes enacted in December 2002 demonstrated a renewed political will to address this problem as well as fixing glaring weaknesses which had undermined the previous legislative regime. These represent key problems in a number of markets around the world (Stamp and Walsh, 1996) and evidence of the impact of policy changes may prove useful for those markets. Also as suggested by our results, the impact of regulation is particularly important as insiders make up a relatively greater proportion of trades in an illiquid market.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model applied in this paper. Section 3 details the data employed and gives some summary statistics on the sample. Section 3 lays out our findings while in section 4
we conclude the paper.
THE MODEL
To compare information asymmetry components of the spreads we employ a decomposition model. Two common types of models have been developed. The first type relies on serial covariances of the time series of trades and quotes to decompose the spread (e.g. George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991) , Stoll (1989 ), Roll (1984 ). The components could be inferred by analyzing how dealers update their quotes after a trade occurred. One weakness of these models, however, is their use of quoted spread rather than the more relevant traded spread, which is a better measure of the actual cost of trading. For this reason we use the second type of decomposition models, the trade indicator models.
Trade indicator models rely on identifying whether a trade was buyer or seller initiated and relating that to changes in prices. Of this type there are three main models, Glosten and Harris (1988) , MRR and Huang and Stoll (1997) . Huang and Stoll (1997) propose a model which explicitly decomposes prices into all three of the costs commonly associated with spreads, order-processing, inventory-holding and information asymmetry. The explicit decomposition of the inventory-holding costs however, makes the model of Huang and Stoll (1997) inappropriate for use in a market with an electronic limit order book (LOB). In these markets inventory costs play little or no role in the setting of prices. (Ahn, Cai, Hamao and Ho, 2002; Chung, Van Ness and Van Ness, 2004) . The models of Glosten and Harris and MRR, which have been applied to LOB markets (e.g. Ahn et al., de Jong, Nijman and Roell, 1996) , are more suitable as they model only two components, permanent price impacts, which cover information asymmetry, and transitory price effects, which covers both order-processing and any inventory-holding costs. 
ii Therefore the innovation in the efficient price is
where θ measures the information asymmetry.
Liquidity providers, who face order processing and inventory costs associated with trading, provide quotes for the ask ( for ask and bid, respectively, where φ is the per share compensation for these costs. The traded price is a consequence of these quoted prices and is given as
where ξ t captures the effects of price discreteness. Expressing (2) in first differences we obtain
To estimate (3), we employ Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) using the orthogonality conditions
where α captures the drift in returns and u t follows from (3). The orthogonality conditions applied are essentially OLS conditions with an additional condition to identify ρ. The advantage of using GMM is that it places no distributional assumptions resulting in more accurate standard errors. Since, the error term in (3) is auto-correlated, we control for heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation in the standard errors using a Newey-West (1987) correction. In the estimation of the model we scale all price data by 100.
III. DATA AND SAMPLE
The New Zealand Exchange is one of the smallest and least liquid, developed market around the world (see Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002) . Over the course of our sample period, the exchange had between 149 and 164 domestic issuers of equity, with a market capitalisation in August 2004 of $NZ 37 billion. It also averaged between 40,000 and 60,000 trades per month valued at around NZ$2 billion. The market runs an electronic limit order book with no designated market makers. There are, however, a number of market participants that do act to provide liquidity in the market, although they have no regulatory obligation to do so. The exchange also runs a pre-opening session (between 9-10am) during which buys and sells can cross and the opening price is set to clear the market. There is also a post-close period (between 5-5:30pm) to allow for post-trading adjustment of orders, although price and trade changes are governed by a tight set of rules. As prices are set under different mechanisms in these periods we exclude all trades that fall outside the normal trading hours.
We obtain intraday transaction data including the bid and ask quotes at the Ahn et al. (2002) and Brockman and Chung (1999) who consider markets with limit order books. When we separate the sample into pre-and postchange we observe a significant drop in both absolute and percentage spreads.
However, we do not observe a significant change in the other market variables (number of trades and price level) implying that market conditions have remained similar. Dollars spreads drop by nearly a quarter, with a 0.25% decline in average percentage spread. Finally, we observe evidence of a significant downward trend in the median volatility in daily prices pre-and post-change, although we observe a slight increase in average volatility. This implies that absent a handful of companies, the majority of the sample appears to be less volatile following the new regulations.
V. RESULTS
If the change in legislation has reduced the incidence and profitability of insider trading, it would be expected that the proportion of the spread accounted for by information asymmetry would have decreased between the pre-and post-change subperiods. The full sample estimates show that the average proportion of information asymmetry is over 58%, although the median value is higher at 60%. This suggests that a handful of stocks have a lower proportion, which has driven the average down.
This pattern is common across the estimates regardless of the length or timing of the sample period.
The influence of the change in regulations that occurred can be seen in the differences in the parameter estimates in the pre-and post-change sub-samples. The information asymmetry component, θ, is lower after the introduction of the laws with a decrease of nearly 0.2. This effect is also observed in the decrease in the median value. The decrease in θ has also resulted in a reduction in the proportion of information asymmetry (IA) between the pre-and post-change periods despite the concurrent decrease in the mean value of φ , representing order-processing and inventory holding costs.
In the pre-change subperiod, nearly 59% of the spread is attributable to adverse selection costs. This is higher than has been found in most other studies of the components of the spreads. IA has typically been observed to make up less than 50% of the spread regardless of the model followed and the markets studied. For the US studies have found IA proportion between 35-50% (Stoll (1989) 43%, MRR 35-51%, Affleck-Graves, Hedge and Miller (1994) 43%, Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) 39.2%, Kim and Ogden (1996) . We estimate (5) using ordinary least squares. Similar to (3), there is auto-correlation in the error term of the model, therefore we compute standard errors with Newey-West adjustments. We also truncated the sample as per de Jong, Nijman and Roell (1996) by removing all transactions that had twice the median volume traded. This is to remove the effect of large trades as discussed in Hausman, Lo and MacKinlay (1992) .
The results in Table 3 present the Glosten and Harris (1988) models parameter estimates and the proportion of information asymmetry. As per the findings of the MRR model we find that the introduction of the act has had an impact on the spread cost components. The Glosten and Harris (1988) estimates are however lower than those found with the MRR which is consistent with other studies (Ahn et al., 2002) . We do observe significant decreases in both the components making up the information asymmetry component, θ 0 and θ 1 . The reduction in these values results in a significant reduction in the proportion of the spread IA composes, down by 1.5%. The patterns that we observe are therefore virtually identical between the Glosten and Harris (1988) and the MRR estimates.
The model of bid-ask decomposition from MRR also allows the influence of the various sources of price volatility to be determined. They note that price volatility is driven by variance in public news shocks and by microstructure frictions. In particular there are 3 major frictions that work on the variance in prices, price discreteness, trading costs and information asymmetry. If the SMAA has been effective in reducing the amount of informational asymmetry in the market, then it would be expected that the portion of price volatility caused by IA should also have been reduced. 
The first defines the variance of the transaction price changes and the second deals with serial covariances in the pricing errors.
Rearranging (6) to solve for each of the price volatility components we get the following terms: news shocks ( to market frictions has increased by about 5%. However, the percentage of information asymmetry to market frictions has decreased significantly over the two sub-periods. The increase of the proportion of market frictions is mainly driven by an increase in trading costs and a decrease in the public information component.
Panel B presents the number of firms that had increases or decreases in the proportion of each cost making up price volatility. Nearly 70% of companies had a reduction in the contribution of IA to price volatility providing further support for the notion that the new regulations have reduced information asymmetry in the markets generally. The worsening in mean trading costs is also reflected in the 40 companies that had an increase in the proportion suggesting this increase is also a global effect.
The other decreasing components, news announcements and price discreteness, both had marginally more decreases than increases while the reverse was true for the interaction term.
We also sorted the contributions to volatility by both the number of trades and the pre-change proportion of asymmetry in the spreads. As can be seen in Panel C, while the mean proportions of IA between the low and high trades has decreased by similar amounts, the median decreases are vastly different. High trades see only a 1% decrease after the introduction of the new laws, low trades however observe a 5.5% decrease suggesting a much more profound impact on a wider number of firms.
The results for the high and low asymmetry sorts show little impact on those firms with the least asymmetry but nearly an 8% decrease for those with the most asymmetry pre-change. Again the results suggest that while there has been a general decrease in the impact of IA on price volatility, the effect seems to be related to the level of insider trading before the change.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we examine the impact of a significant tightening in regulations targeting all aspects of insider trading and dealing. We explore this issue in the context of New Zealand, a small, illiquid and previously poorly regulated market with respect to insider trading. Recent changes in the regulatory regime provide an ideal setting to examine the impact of effective government intervention on the cost of trading. We decompose the separate components of the spread and find evidence of a strong relationship between the efficacy of insider trading rules and proportion of the spread attributable to information asymmetry. These results are robust over different model specifications. Splitting the sample on the basis of liquidity (number of trades) and pre-change information asymmetry, we find that these results are mainly driven by illiquid firms who suffer form high information asymmetry, which implies that government intervention is most beneficial for these firms. Lastly, we find a significant drop in the percentage of market frictions that is attributable to information asymmetry.
Overall the results showed a decrease in trading costs that are mainly driven by a decline in information asymmetry. The market setting of New Zealand suggests the experience of introducing effective measures to limit insiders may be widely applicable. Many countries suffer a similar lack of appropriate regulation and/or political will to address insider trading. While the liquidity of the New Zealand market is not representative of other developed markets, a majority of stocks listed on these markets may suffer from a similar lack of market attention. For these stocks and countries effective government intervention may be beneficial. 
. Volatility in Daily Prices was measured as the standard deviation of the change in the closing daily price. *** indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5%. Significance of means were calculated between the pre and post change samples using the matched pairs t-test. Significance of the medians were calculated using the MannWhitney-Wilcoxon test. 
Post-Change
Panel A presents the parameter estimates for the sample of 70 companies over the indicated time period (month and year) for the three parameters of interest, θ, the asymmetric information component of the spread, Φ, the cost per share of trading and ρ, the autocorrelation of the order flow. The proportion of information asymmetry was calculated as the cross-sectional average of θ /( θ + Φ ) and the standard error as the cross-sectional average of Hamilton (1994) . Prices were scaled in the estimation procedure by 100. Low and High Trades contain the estimates of the lowest and highest 30 companies when sorted by number of trades. Low Asymmetry and High Asymmetry contain the lowest and highest 30 companies when sorted by pre-change proportion of information asymmetry. *** indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5%, * indicates significant at 1% using the matched pairs t-test for the difference between pre and post-change. 
FOOTNOTES
1 Details on the structure of the previous regime and the exact nature of the changes can be found in Gilbert, Tourani-Rad and Wisniewski (2005) . 2 Glosten and Harris (1988) differ in this respect, because they consider all information in the arrival of a trade as a surprise.
